Archived Update: 1 May 2006

We'll be having a parlor meeting at the home of Eddy Resnick on Thursday, May 18, at 20:00, in Ginot Shomron.

Address:

These parlor meetings are extremely important at this stage. If you can possibly host one sometime towards the end of May or during June, before the hot doldrums of summer, please give it serious consideration and let us know. All you have to provide is a home environment for 12-20 participants for about an hour and a half.

We still need a few T-shirt orders to complete our first run of 50. If you're looking for a reasonably priced, high quality (according to the distributor) T-shirt with a message, please let me know. Estimated price is NIS 20 per shirt. Also, be sure to mention size. You can see the t-shirt at the website, http://www.directrepisrael.org/EN/Stuff.html

A Direct Representational Democracy article appeared in the Hebrew version of Ha'aretz on 16 April. You can still read it at

http://www.haaretz.co.il/hasite/pages/ShArtPE.jhtml?itemNo=706169

It's a little ironic because I was asked to submit the article to the English language version of the paper. They translated it, published it in Hebrew, and then neglected to publish it in the original English. Oh, well... the English version appears below. We'll soon be putting up a new web page at our site to include articles and readings.

On Yom HaZikaron, may we remember those who fell defending Eretz Yisrael and those who died as victims of terror attacks.

Have a happy Yom Ha'Atzma'ut. We have great reason to be proud and thankful... and every reason to strive for a system that works.

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In this election year, a variety of reforms have been proposed for our electoral system. Some rely on political magic formulas rather than adherence to solid principles of public service. A case in point is Aharon Nathan's system of "Total Representationג€ described recently in Haaretz. While giving a nod to direct elections as all mixed systems do, TR retains a degree of proportionalism that would damage both accountability and efficiency in government.

Total Representation, or "TR," proposes direct voting in 90 single-representative districts. Votes for losing candidates would be re-distributed to their parties in order to proportionally divide up the remaining 30 Knesset seats. But what if you voted for your candidate on the basis of her/his individual merits, and not on party affiliation? Your vote might not just fail to elect your choice - it could be allocated to individuals you don't know or individuals you oppose as the party exercises your proxy. Bear in mind that most Israelis are NOT party members and do not vote in primaries. So, many votes will go towards candidates without their voters' explicit or implicit consent. Unless he feels fairly sure that his candidate of choice can win, a voter will likely weigh party affiliation far more than a candidate's individual abilities or integrity. Clearly, accountability suffers.

What if a candidate is running as an independent or endorsed by more than one party? TR cannot accommodate this option without complex alteration. These factors bring us to the unpleasant realization that the main beneficiaries of Nathan's proposed system are the major party leaderships, not the voting public.

Mixed proportional/constituency systems dilute the political mandate of the majority by weakening the influence of directly elected officials. Under TR, one quarter of the legislators would not be directly accountable to any constituency. We end up with two classes of legislators, those who must personally win elections and those who don't. Many of the latter would be major party leaders and hacks, who would keep their Knesset seats without winning a single constituency election. These individuals would enjoy advantages of influence exploitable by narrow interests. Making up a quarter of MKs, they would likely determine the balance in a legislative voting process. This uneven playing field would make it difficult for a directly elected MK to effectively defy the party line in serving his conscience and constituency. The party leaderships gain while public accountability suffers.

Would, as Nathan claims, a mixed proportional/direct electoral system produce more neutral voter districting than a completely direct system? Proportionally elected legislators, unaccountable to any constituency, are at least as motivated to tip the gerrymandering balance to their party interests. Furthermore, TR might not benefit minority interests. As all regional contests would likely field candidates from the major parties, most second-place losers would also be from major parties. As most ג€œlosingג€ votes might be swept by the big parties, minority parties might not even be significantly represented among those appointed to the Knesset from these votes. Again, great for the major party leaderships, not so great for the rest of us.

Making MKs accountable requires making all MKs accountable. Direct Representational Democracy for Israel proposes that Israel's electorate be divided into 120 districts, each directly electing a single representative to the Knesset. We need government reform that will not compromise on applied principles of public service and individual accountability, one that encourages unification through common cause. Even partial proportionalism entrenches the divisive, wasteful principle of sectarian power grabbing that has cost us so much and benefitted us so little.

The writer is a communication consultant and the founder of Direct Representational Democracy for Israel. http://www.directrepisrael.org