Wasn't this tried a few years ago?

No, direct representation has NEVER been applied in the Knesset as a whole, After a great deal of public outcry, the major parties "compromised" to amend the law to directly elect *only* the prime minister, the first time on May 29, 1996. However, party committees continued to delegate their shares of Knesset seats. The elected Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, still had to form his government from blocks of party-selected representatives. As a result, there was NO EFFECTIVE CHANGE towards direct representation in the Knesset.

The hegemony of the political parties in appointing Knesset members worked to stymie any gains that might have been attributable to a direct election of the prime minister because the same party horse-trading continued. The lack of responsibility of individual Knesset members, regarding their conduct and meager achievements, remained in place. The small, narrow-interest parties - whose members were electable only under the proportional system - could still sell their votes to the highest coalition bidder.

Aren't different political perspectives better represented by proportional representation? Doesn't proportional representation better protect minorities?

No. With enough citizen constituencies, a variety of political perspectives similar to those held in the populace will be represented within the body of elected legislators. Successful candidates will be those who effectively address the widest range of concerns within a constituency, including minority concerns. Courting minorities will be crucial to these candidates on the local level, just as courting minorities continues to be crucial to political parties at the national level. A constitutional framework of laws will protect minority rights as well.

It is important to remember that, as an institution of public service, representative government should represent people, not political perspectives. Political perspectives don't pay taxes, raise children, serve in the army, or work at jobs; people do.

Legislators should justify their positions of responsibility not as representatives of separate political perspectives, but as individuals doing a job for their constituencies. To be effective, legislators must be "whole people," more than mere rubber stamps for their parties. No political philosophy can be applied effectively towards every problem of national service. For that you need a reasonable, accountable human being.

It is also important to note that under any system of government, ideas, philosophies, and perspectives don't rule; powerful individuals do. In Israel's proportional representation, those individuals who control the party leadership ultimately select the party's MKs, and dictate their votes in Knesset. It is they, not their members, who are the constituents of their proportional representatives. In most cases, the leaders of the parties have very, very little accountability to the citizens they themselves claim to represent.

It is questionable whether the views broadcast by the parties in a proportional democracy actually represent the sensibilities held by the population. Fewer and fewer Israelis choose to become members of political parties. This is partly due to the loss of faith in, and identification with, the party as the trustworthy political benefactor. Thus, overall, the Israeli populace has little influence in the overall choice of candidates in the larger parties. When they vote, many, perhaps most, Israelis aren't actually selecting a choice that represents them but rather the "lesser among evils." Ask an Israeli "who represents you?" in the Knesset and most won't even understand the question.

Only the corrupt benefit when government officials remain unaccountable to citizen constituencies. Promises remain unfulfilled, tax money is wasted, and important programs are neglected. Only direct representation guarantees that legislators will be dependent on a perception of public service and accountable if they should fail to serve effectively.

Aren't there more urgent political problems facing Israel's government?

More than ever, Israel needs the best legislators, the best representatives, and the best leaders she can get. We need responsible legislators who are ready to serve, not carve out power niches. With the challenges of living security in the Middle East, growing our economy, and educating our children, good government is not a luxury, it is a necessity.

In order to move forward together, as a unified people, we need to fix our political system's foundations to promote individual responsibility, accountability, and excellence. The government is the heart of the body of our country. That heart has to become strong and efficient.

Because this problem is so urgent and fundamental, we activists come from several different political perspectives. We don't necessarily agree on every detail of how the government should run. We do agree, however, that direct representative democracy is a crucial element for Israel's political health, and that it should be implemented as soon as possible.

In the event of a vacancy on the Supreme Court, you propose that a judge be nominated by the executive branch and confirmed by the legislative branch. Doesn't this politicize the appointment of judges?

In the present system, the high court justices control the process of appointing new justices to fill vacancies, like some kind of exclusive club. This is unheard of in other western democracies. Currently, Chief Justice Aharon Barak effectively determines the new justice according to his own political biases, as is apparent in the recent case of Ruth Gavizon.

A judge has no need to justify his professional decisions that fall within a legal framework. This type of independence is correct and necessary for a judge, but not for those who would appoint judges. With the direct representation, the chief executive and legislators will be less directly controlled by party central committees and far more accountable to the public. In his task to nominate a supreme court justice, the chief executive will feel more pressure to make his suggestions appear logical, reasonable, and professional. Because new governments are elected much more frequently than supreme court judges are appointed, there is a greater likelihood under that proposed system, with legislative confirmation, will exhibit fewer general political biases in the long run.

Politics are an unavoidable factor in any supreme court judicial selection, especially under Israel's current system. The proposed system, however, will be much more transparent to the public, the deliberations and decisions will be matters of public record, and the results will be capable, professional judges. We suggest further reading on the system of supreme court appointment in the United States.

Is it true that in a system of direct representation the votes for a losing candidate are "wasted?"

No government policy will find universal favor, which means that there must be losers in political contests. In direct representation systems the votes cast for candidates other than the winners (whether by first round or runoff), do not become aggregated for alternate representation. For this reason, direct representation is crudely labeled "Winner Take All." This causes some critics to argue that these votes as "wasted," as if their vote had no effect in the subsequent political process. This argument ignores some very important points.

First, an election itself is the final part of a much longer campaign. In direct representation systems, regional campaigns raise critical issues and spark discussion and debate among citizens and candidates. Citizen activism can set the political agenda and influences the decision processes of the candidates, as they must address the widest range of concerns in order to be elected.

Second, an election with a narrow majority motivates the winning candidate to excel in his public service, as there is a stronger chance that otherwise he will be unseated in the next election. A strong oppositional showing at the polls reminds him that significant differences of opinion exist and that opposition can grow if he does not "deliver the goods" as an effective legislator.

Third, the system of a single representative elected to a district encourages different groups to find common ground and support a candidate who will serve their mutual interests. Cooperation is maximized to achieve a stronger electoral showing.

Finally, the decision to elect an individual to serve a specific job considers every vote equally. Until the voting is over and the winner is announced, every vote is a voice raised and heard in the decision making process.

Is it "undemocratic" when representatives are only those who win regional elections by absolute majority in constiuencies?

To state that the constituency system produces "undemocratic results" implies a narrow definition of "democracy" as a system of power sharing among recognized political subgroups. Democratic government, however, should protect the interests of individuals, not groups. When government is viewed as an organization dedicated to public service to citizens as individuals, through the provision of essential government services, constituency representation becomes the most effective and fair system. Only under a system of constituency will there be a clear line of political empowerment and accountability between individual legislator and individual citizen.

Democratic principles declare that the will of the majority of the people must be respected. Proportional representation does not result in a greater reflection of the will of the majority of the people. Rather, PR lets people empower elite committees who then choose and dictate to blocs of representatives. This is a "detour" in the direct line of empowerment and accountability between citizen and representative. It allows unelected individuals to control government officials and allows MKs to act irresponsibly and unethically.

Would a combined system of direct representation and proportional representation be a better way?

No.

Combined systems try to mix two incompatible principles: public service and power sharing. Inevitably, the power sharing elements will exploit their power to gain material benefits, usually at the expense of sincere efforts towards public service.

Combined systems produce legislators of different status, those who are directly accountable to a defined constituency and those who are accountable only to a political party's central committee. This opens the door to the patronization and influence-peddling that has become commonplace in our current proportional system.

Combined systems under-represent regional concerns, especially those of citizens living in the periphery, by either decreasing the ratio of representatives to citizens or by diluting the influence of directly elected representatives.

A famous quote defines "politics" as "the art of compromise." All political systems require the capability for compromise solutions for specific issues. There should be no compromise, however, on the principles that define our system of government. When you build a house, you don't compromise on foundations. Once the foundations are in place, you compromise on issues of detail - wallpaper, flooring, lighting, etc. Our principles of government are the foundations for the structure that will house and direct legitimate political power. We can compromise on specific policy issues but the structure that will empower the debate must stand firmly rooted in clear principles of governance.

Why not have electoral districts with multiple representatives?

Multi-representative districts might seem to be a beneficial compromise between direct representation (single-representative constituency) and the proportional system. However, they present serious problems similar to those of proportional representation.

Multi-representative districts dilute and weaken the element of direct, individual accountability; representatives aren't individually defined as being exclusively responsible for serving a region in the legislature.

Multi-representative districts tend to under-represent voters living in the periphery. This is because multi-representative districts include much larger populations than single-representative constituencies. Political activity within a district naturally occurs around more concentrated population centers.

Multi-representative districts tend to diminish the local accessibility citizens have to their legislators. This is because multi-representative districts are geographically much larger than single-representative districts. In regions outside the major cities, this is especially true.

Why not reserve a number of Knesset seats for nationally elected MKs?

Having a number of MKs elected nationally might seem to be a beneficial compromise between direct representation (single-representative constituency) and the proportional system. However, there are serious drawbacks to this approach.

The presence of nationally elected MKs dilutes the influence of regionally elected MKs.

Realizing that larger population centers have more voters, nationally elected MKs are more likely to address the interests of larger population centers. This results in the under-representation of citizens in peripheral areas.

A system that combines regionally elected MKs with nationally elected MKs produces legislators of different status. Regionally elected MKs have a clearly defined one-to-one relationship of empowerment and accountability with their constituents. If legislative action is required or desired by citizens in a district, the citizens and the MK know who is responsible to address that issue. Nationally elected MKs have no such direct, regional responsibility or accountability. This difference in status can be exploited to serve narrow interests or lead to political patronization.

Why push for direct, regional representation AND a presidential system? Wouldn't it be better to first achieve one and then the other?

In the short term, partial "compromise" measures are easier to achieve. Unfortunately, they are also prone to being ineffective.

The direct election of MKs as constituency representatives and the separate election of the chief executive are inseparable aspects of a government based on public service. The prior effort to directly elect the PM failed to link these two complementary measures. Instead, the law was a flawed compromise that combined, in the same organizational body, the dynamics of public service (direct election of the PM) and power-sharing (parliamentary coalition government). History should have taught us that the working principles of public service cannot coexist with those of power-sharing. Power-sharing dynamics will always corrupt public service functions.

If we achieve the direct, regional election of MKs, but continue to form the executive as a parliamentary coalition, we will find ourselves in a similar political swamp as we did in the Netanyahu and Barak governments. Specifically, directly elected MKs will have conflicts of interest between serving their constituencies and trying to grab the reigns of executive power. This would be a hollow victory. MKs must remain separated and functionally independent from the executive branch so that they can effectively prevent abuses in the executive branch.

Our country's current relationship with its government is like a person living in a house with rotten foundations. He can keep rebuilding the walls that keep collapsing as a "compromise" measure - it's cheaper and more convenient. However, he's better off mending those foundations. So are we.

Would a regional, direct system give an advantage to anti-Zionist minority elements in Israel?

This is highly unlikely for several reasons. In fact, such groups enjoy significant advantages under the current system, advantages that we hope to eliminate.

The current proportional system is based on a nationwide political campaign and organizing effort. Members of an interest group from all over the country are able to combine their votes without regard for regional location. Thus narrow interest groups, including extreme anti-Zionist Haredi, Arab, and other groups, actually gain more electoral support than they would if they had to field specific candidates in separate, regional elections. A direct, majority system tends to benefit larger, mainstream parties rather than fringes. Proportional systems benefit more narrowly-defined sectarian interests.

In places where extremist elements may constitute a significant portion of the population, three factors reduce the advantages to extremist parties. First, local interests such as educational and infrastructure funding will influence voters and largely drive campaigns. Second, local affiliations, in some cases, clan memberships or local social memberships, will reduce the success of anti-Zionist ideological zealotry. Candidates at the local level are more dependent on satisfying the local population than on national ideological political machines. As coalitions will not rule under a separation of branches, it is likely that mainstream parties will probably do better under the majority system even in the Arab and Haredi communities than they do under the current system.

Direct, regional, majority systems are the best electoral tool to protect the interests of the mainstream, political majority. They are also the best mechanism for enabling a heterogeneous population form a political majority. Furthermore, direct, regional, majority elections tend to protect the interests of minorities, so long as these minority interests do not significantly harm the interests of the majority.

What is the "Norwegian Law?" Why are some reformers promoting it? Will it help Israel's democracy?

The proposed "Norwegian Law," or the "MK Replacement Law," states that any Member of Knesset who is appointed a minister in the executive government will resign her/his membership of the Knesset. Her/His vacated Knesset seat will then be filled by someone chosen by her/his party. If the minister ceases to serve in the government, she/he may opt to immediately reclaim her/his Knesset seat and the replacement will resign.

Some reformers promote this option because, they claim, it retains the legislature's involvement in forming the executive government while introducing a personnel separation between the legislative and executive branches. Israel's current weak or non-existent separation between the legislative and executive branches is correctly identified as a conflict of interests leading to corruption and ineffectiveness.

The need to strongly separate the branches of government is crucial. However, the Norwegian system fails to improve upon any of the deficits of Israel's weak separation. First, it continues to force the nation's chief executive to satisfy the demands of a factional coalition before serving the interests and needs of the national constituency. Second, it continues the denial of the public's right to specifically choose those who would speak and write laws in their names. Third, it concentrates even more power in the party central committees to dictate to Knesset Members. Ironically some supporters of the Norwegian Law also propose that some MKs be directly chosen by regional constituencies. When a directly, regionally elected MK becomes a minister, the Norwegian Law would deny a constituency the right to popularly select her/his replacement. Accountability to the voting public suffers and the dominating power of the party leadership becomes stronger.

Selecting our legislators should be considered the hiring of a public servant or service professional. It is a personal choice. Should an elected public servant be unable or unwilling to continue in her/his elected role, it should be up to her/his constituency to decide the replacement. Immediate proxy replacements should be provisional and temporary, valid for the shortest time necessary to organize another direct, popular, majority vote.

The Norwegian Law is no improvement; it is a fig leaf to cover the same weak and ineffective separation of government branches that currently exists.